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Abstract 
 
The main objective of this work is to reflect the structural changes that have 
characterized the aluminium industry over the last few decades. I order to capture the 
changes in competition I have estimated cost and related it to output prices by  
illustrating the effect of the prevalent industry risk sharing agreements. I argue that, 
contrary to what the microeconomic paradigm envisages, in the short run prices mainly 
determine costs as the consequence of a an exchange pricing system involving 
contractual risk-sharing arrangements. Costs determine prices only in the long run 
through investment in new smelting capacity. Previous studies of the aluminium 
industry had often used unreliable measures of weighted average variable cost. The 
main contribution of this work lies on the estimation of cost applying the flexible 
translog  framework to a unique set of proprietary data. 
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1. Introduction: 
 
   The standard microeconomic paradigm envisages a direct link between cost and prices 
which firms set on a variable mar-up basis in relation to the position and slope of the 
product demand curve. This paradigm applies most directly to manufacturing industry. 
It cannot be applied without modification to raw materials producing industries in 
which prices are set on competitive exchanges. In such markets, firms have no direct 
control over prices and the relationship between production cost and prices must 
therefore be indirect. In this paper, I attempt to characterize the cost-price relationships 
in the aluminium industry. 
 
Historically, the aluminium industry was mainly dominated by a group of six 
large multinational companies, which set producer prices on cost class basis. However 
concentration diminished significantly2 during the 1970's and 1980's, and with the start 
on aluminium futures trading on the London Metal Exchange (LME ) in 1978 the major 
producer lost their ability to directly control prices. By the mid 1980's aluminium was 
effectively sold world-wide on the basis of LME quotations. Since then there has been 
significant change on the determination of price cost margins. 
 
It is widely hold that mineral companies have not been highly profitable over the 
last two decades. One explanation to this is that long term price trends have been 
unfavourable due to the effects of globalization on mining companies. Firms can no 
longer control prices and have reacted to the increased international competition by 
focusing on cost reduction and increased efficiency through economies of scale, 
mergers, acquisitions and technological improvements to facilities. Three major mergers 
and several smaller ones were completed in the ongoing consolidation of aluminium 
smelting and manufacturing capacity. In the year 2000 Alcoa Inc. and Reynolds Metals 
Company Limited completed their merger after receiving approval from regulatory 
activities. Alcoa remained the largest producer of primary aluminium. Over the same 
year, Alcan Aluminium completed its merger with Alusuisse to become Alcan Inc. the 
largest packaging company in the world.  Additionally Russky Aluminii, or Russian 
Aluminium, was formed through an amalgamation of Sibersky Aluminium´s assets with 
                                                 
2 For figures and discussion in concentration  and market power, see chapter 1 p.11-15. 
the aluminium interest of Sibneft Oil. Related factors such as the large increase in 
exports from the Russia and the other ex-Soviet republics in recent years has also 
contributed to the downward pressure in profits, as well as the increase in productivity 
due to the entrance of new more efficient firms into the market. 
The major cost components in aluminium production are the cost of the raw 
material and the cost of electricity required to release aluminium metal from the 
alumina feed. Aluminium smelters frequently draw their power from dedicated (often 
hydro) electricity generation plants which do not have alternative buyers for their 
power. For this reason smelters, electricity generators and alumina refineries are often 
linked by risk sharing contracts, with the consequence that power input prices vary with 
the aluminium price. In aluminium, therefore the direct link is mainly from price to 
costs and not from costs to price. In order to see how costs influence prices we need to 
consider investment in new smelting capacity, which will depend on production costs 
through the profitability of both current production and new investment. 
 
The changes outlined above that have taken place within the aluminium 
production and price setting structure motivate the development of the present study. 
The main purpose of this paper is to estimate the cost structure of aluminium smelting 
and to look at the relationship between costs and output prices taking into account the 
prevalence of industry risk sharing agreements. 
 
The model is developed in three stages: 
1. Estimation of the translog cost function for aluminium smelting. The use of this 
technique to estimate cost is related to the work of Lindquiest (1998), who applied 
the translog function to panel data for six Norwegian aluminium smelting plants. 
Earlier studies of the aluminium industry, such as that of Rosebaum (1987), Froem 
and Gewe (1987) and Donowitz et al. (1987) had to assume fixed input coefficients 
and constant returns to scale. As a consequence the standard way to calculate 
margins, involved a measure of average variable cost, often not reliable due to the 
lack of accuracy of production cost reports. It turns out that if the fixed input 
demand and constant returns to scale assumptions are not valid, the standard way of 
calculating cost is not correct and leads to an incorrect inference about cost and its 
relationship with price over time. This motivates the application of the translog 
framework to a proprietary set of industry level data. 
2. Once the cost structure is estimated, I relate this to industry prices. I do this by 
distinguishing between the short and the long run. To model the short run dynamics, 
I set up a series of relationships showing the impact of aluminium price on power 
and alumina input prices. In order to relate cost and prices in the long run I set up an 
equation relating investment in new smelter capacity to profitability and a measure 
of Tobin's Q for the aluminium sector. 
3.  The model is closed up with the demand and supply equations reflecting the price 
setting behaviour within aluminium smelting. The former consists of a crude 
relationship linking the change in the aluminium price to the balance between 
aluminium consumption and capacity. In the latter production is restricted to be 
autoregressive and dependent on production capacity and lagged prices. 
 
    This model allows me to determine the relationship between cost and prices, and  
trace out the effects of shocks to either costs or to the aluminium price on the complete 
set of price, cost, and production variables. It is made possible through the availability 
of a proprietary set of aluminium production cost capacity data provided by a consulting 
company. 
 
The remainder of this chapter falls into seven sections. Section 2 provides a full 
description of the data. In section 3 I set up the translog cost function to describe the 
aluminium cost structure. In section 4 I describe the short and price-cost relationships. 
In section 5 I set up the long run relationship between cost and prices. In section 4.6 I 
close the model by setting up the demand and supply schedules for aluminium smelting 
and linking production capacity to output prices.. I conclude in section 7. 
 
 
2. Data description 
   I have a complete set of aluminium annual cost data covering the period 1982-1998. 
This includes data for total weighted average variable cost, power cost, power use, 
alumina price, alumina cost and capacity.  These data were provided by the consulting 
firm Anthony Birds Associates. Annual data on aluminium consumption and production 
were obtained from the World Bulletin of Metal Statistics (WBMS) 
To estimate the aluminium investment structure I have used 
• Aluminium share price yearly data for the major aluminium producers: Alcan 
(Canada), Alcoa (USA), and Reynolds (USA) for the period 1975 to 2000 
(Datastream) 
• US capital equipment US  yearly data for the period 1970-1999 (IMF, International 
Financial Statistics, September 2000)  
• Annual average data on the nominal interest rates: US 3 year government bond rate ( 
IMF, International Financial Statistics, September 2000) 
 
 
3. Model specification for the aluminium production 
process: the translog function  
 
   I set up a market model determining prices where each firm is a price taker and 
minimizes production costs for given prices. I justify this assumption by recognizing 
that from the mid-eighties, individual producers lost their ability to control prices as the 
consequence of the LME price becoming the industry market price standard. Over the 
same period, industry concentration has dropped significantly (see I.Figuerola-Ferretti 
(2002) p11-15) to the extent that individual firms can now be described as  'price takers'. 
The firm level model consists of a translog cost function and two price equations 
reflecting the risk sharing contracts, which determine the short-run input-output price 
relationships. I link this production side framework to the market environment defined 
by supply and demand equations, via an investment equation relating investment 
(defined as the change in capacity) to profits, and a measure of Tobin's q. This allows 
me to set up a long run relationship between cost and prices, by establishing that lower 
cost (and thus higher profits) lead to higher investment. I close the model with a 
relationship linking the metal price to the balance between capacity and consumption, 
and tree additional consumption, price and output equations representing the demand 
and supply framework within aluminium smelting. I model consumption as a function 
of industrial production and lagged aluminium prices, and output as a function of 
capacity and lagged aluminium prices.  The complete set of equations allow model 
simulation and impulse response analysis (see section 4.7) allowing me to trace out the 
effects of shocks to each of the variables in the system. 
 
3.1 Theoretical considerations 
 
   In the empirical estimation of the aluminium cost structure I have used a non-
homothetic transcendental logarithmic (translog) cost function3. This is a second order 
approximation to an arbitrary production function. Unlike the Cobb Douglas and the 
CES functions, this cost function does not impose any restrictions on the substitution 
possibilities among the inputs of production. It also allows scale economies to vary with 
the level of output and, more importantly, it allows input shares to vary over time. This 
is of particular importance for the aluminium production process since evidence shows 
that input demands have not been constant over time. For instance in 1950's it took on 
average around the world about 21 kWh to produce a single kilogram of aluminium 
from alumina. In 1997 it took one of the newest smelters just 14kWh. Figures 4.A.1-
4.A.6 in appendix 4.A plot alumina and power input share values as well as estimated 
cross and own elasticities of substitution for the 1982-1998 period. The graphs show 
that neither input demands nor the substitution elasticities within in aluminium 
production have been constant through our sample period. For this reason we adopt the 
translog framework in order to allow input demands, substitution and price elasticities 
to change over time. 
 
The translog cost function may be written as: 
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where: 
C is total variable cost obtained by adding alumina cost and power cost4 
 pi is the input i price where i= A,E are alumina and power electricity price.  
Y is output measured as production in the aluminium industry 
In order to be well behaved the cost function must satisfy the following conditions 
1) Monotonicity: the cost function should be non negative for every 0),( >∈ ipyVy it 
and it must be non-decreasing in input prices ),(),( 10 ypcypc ≤  when 10 pp ≤  
2) Concavity: )()1(),(),)1(( , ypCtyptCypttpC EaEa −+≥−+  
                                                 
3 For a theoretical discussion see Paraskevopopoulos (2000) 
4 The Weighted Average Variable Cost also includes a small residual cost which I do not model. Instead I 
choose to model the sum of alumina and power costs.  
I impose the symmetry and homogeneity of degree one restrictions, which allow the 
integration of the cost function into the production function: 
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Applying Shephard’s lemma to (1) gives the cost share equation for each variable input 
noting that the first equation in system (4.3) implies that the cost shares have to meet the 
restriction  
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I estimate the following system: 
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subject to restrictions (2), (3), and (4). This model allows input demands to depend on 
exogenous input prices and output and therefore provides a framework in which one can 
undertake comparative static analysis on the aluminium cost and input demand 
structure. 
 
3.2. Estimation method 
 
   I perform all estimations using Iterated Three Stage Leas Squares (I3SLS) on the sub-
system consisting of production and the factor shares. Systems estimation allows 
consideration of the nonlinearities and cross symmetry conditions. Additional 
instruments are the one and two period lagged values of aluminium and input  price 
returns, and the one period lagged production and capacity variables. Use of these 
instruments is justified in terms of the presence of these variables in the reduced forms 
for input prices and production. 
3.3 Estimation results 
 
Table 1: Translog  Cost Function Estimates 
 Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
α0 -9.179526 16.43749 -0.558451 0.5819 
αy 2.822613 3.428152 0.823363 0.4188 
αyy -0.251496 0.360059 -0.698484 0.4919 
αA 0.170048 0.407674 0.417117 0.6805 
γAE 0.076790 0.004499 17.06671 0.0000 
γAA 0.194465 0.031258 6.221216 0.0000 
γAY -0.090672 0.048291 -1.877619 0.0732 
αE 0.340096 0.407674 0.417117 0.6805 
γEE -0.076790 0.004499 17.06671 0.0000 
γEY 0.090672 0.048291 -1.877619 0.0732 
     
SE of regression 0.004115    
R2C 0.999234 DWc 0.6976  
R2A 0.608387 DWA 1.320706  
The table gives the OLS estimates of the pair of equations defined 
by (5).  
 
   Table 4.1 shows the results from estimating the system. The cost function is well 
behaved if it satisfies the monotonicity and concavity conditions. The parameters αA 
(0.1700) and αE (0.8300) are the average shares of alumina and power inputs over the 
sample period, they should be non-negative if the cost function is to satisfy 
monotonicity. Furthermore, we impose that their sum is equal to one. The estimates are 
positive but insignificant. In order to test for monotonicity, I look at the fitted shares. 
The predicted average shares are 57.58% for alumina and 42.43% for power. Fitted  
weighted average variable cost values are positive at all points and highly correlated 
with the true values. Fitted alumina and power input share values are also positive at all 
points over the sample period and highly correlated with the true values (see graphs 
A.1.1 and A.1.2 and A.1.3 in appendix A) suggesting that the translog cost function is 
monotonic. 
The parameters which correspond to the second order terms of the translog cost 
function, γAA (0.1945), γEE (-0.0768), γAE (0.0768),  γEA (0.0768), may be seen as 
constant share elasticities. They are derived from partial differentiation of the factor 
demands (shares) with respect to input prices. They generate the factor share percentage 
shifts for the given change in input prices. The estimates are not all correctly signed. For 
instance the own price parameters γAA, γEE should in principle be negative as one 
expects the demand for alumina and power to decrease as alumina and power prices 
increase. Contrary to expectations, the estimated coefficient γAA is positive and 
significant. This suggests that there may be second order violations, but this may not yet 
be a problem as the bordered Hessian matrix depends on the factor shares as well as the 
constant share elasticities. Power is however price responsive as the constant own share 
elasticity is negative and significant. Its value shows that the total power share will 
decrease by 0.8% if the power price rises by 10%. 
The cross share elasticities5 γAP, γEA may in principle be either positive, negative 
or zero depending on whether the inputs involved are substitutes (positive), 
complements (negative) or neutral (zero). The estimated coefficient γAE is positive and 
significant indicating that, there is some degree of substitutability between power and 
alumina. It indicates that the alumina share should rise by 0.8% when power price rises 
by 10%. Given that we are looking at industry level data this can be interpreted as 
reflecting the improvements in technology that have led to electricity saving techniques 
within aluminium smelting (see p. 89) and the subsequent substitution of power for 
alumina. 
Given the share parameter estimates, one can check the second order conditions 
by calculating the substitution and price elasticities.6 Concavity requires that the matrix 
of substitution elasticities is negative semi-definite. As can be seen in Appendix 4.A.2 
and 4.A.3, own price and substitution elasticities are negative at all points, and cross 
substitution and price elasticities are positive at all points, demonstrating that the 
concavity property is not violated. The mean Allen own price elasticities7  εAA (-1.2371) 
and εEE (-1.0458) are negative. The mean cross price elasticities εAE (0.1019) and εEA 
(0.1360) are positive indicating that alumina and power are substitutes.8  
                                                 
5 Note that the symmetry condition restricts these two parameters to be the same. 
6 For substitution elasticities See Paraskevopoulos 2001 (p. 41)  . 
7 Note that the interpretation of the price and substitution elasticities is very similar to that offered by the 
second order parameters (constant share price elasticities). However they differ in their magnitude 
because the price and substitution elasticities depend on the second order parameters of the cost function 
as well as on their fitted shares. 
8 This is verified by the eigenvalues of the mean Allen price elasticity matrixes which are both negative (-
1.5402, -0.7427) indicating that the matrix is negative semidefinite. 
I now discuss the share elasticities concerning changes in output. 
γAY (-0.09067) and γEY (0.09067) indicate by how much alumina/power input share 
increases given a percentage change in output. γyA is negative and  marginally 
significant indicating that when output increases demand for alumina decreases9 and the 
demand for power electricity increases, as indicated by the sign of the parameter γyp.10. 
The parameters γiY could also be viewed as the change in cost flexibility caused by a 
shift in the price of input I (see Paraskevopoulos 2000 p. 44).  The parameters αy 
(2.822814) can be viewed as the average cost flexibility11 over the years. It is positive 
and greater than one suggesting that the aluminium smelting plants exhibit 
diseconomies of size. Nevertheless it is not significant. Old aluminium smelting plants 
may experience diseconomies of size due to plant over investment. The parameter αyy 
(-0.251496) measures the cost flexibility response to changes in output. It is negative 
and indicates that when output increases by 1% cost flexibility decreases by 0.25%. 
However the parameter is not significant.  
 
Since some of our estimated output parameters are insignificant, I have looked 
for possible parsimonious simplifications. Table 2 shows results of these tests.12 
 
TABLE  2: Hypothesis testing 
 Number of  χ2 χ2 
Hypotheses restrictions value p value 
Homotheticity 1 3.5254 0.0604 
Homogeneity 2 4.3097 0.1159 
CRTS 3 4723.29 0.000 
UELST 1 291.272 0.0000 
HUELST 2 300.0080 0.0000 
Cobb Douglas 4 127.05 0.0000 
CRTS Constant Returns to Scale 
UELST Unitary Elasticity of Substitution 
HUELAST Homotheticity and Unitary Elasticity of Substitution 
The table gives the outcomes of the likelihood ratio tests on the restrcitions 
imposed in the model, estimates of which were reported in Table 4.1. 
 
                                                 
9 Note that this suggests that alumina is an inferior or regressive good, contrary to what one would expect 
a priori. 
10 Note that not all the output share elasticities should have a negative sign as firms should not be able to 
increase their output while decreasing the utilization of the inputs. In terms of the cost function properties 
this would violate monotonicity. 
11 Cost flexibility is the elasticity of cost with respect to output (see Paraskevopoulos 2000 p 45). 
12 See Paraskevopoulos 2000 p. 45-46 for discussion on restrictions for testing different models. 
Whereas it can be argued that there is weak evidence supporting homotheticity, our 
model strongly rejects any further simplification.  
 
4. The short run price cost relationships: 
 
    In this section I characterize short run relationship between aluminium input cost and 
output prices. Because the price of alumina and power electricity are linked to the 
aluminium price via risk sharing contracts we argue that in the short run output prices 
determine input prices. 
 
4.1. The effect of aluminium prices on alumina prices 
 
   A plot of annual observations of the logs of alumina and aluminium prices for the 
1982-1998 period13 suggests that lagged aluminium prices are positively related to 
current alumina prices. This is verified by the cross correlation analysis,14 which shows 
high one and two period positive cross correlations between the alumina and aluminium 
prices. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
13 See Figure C.1 in appendix C 
14 See tables C.1 and C.2 in appendix C. 
 
 
Table 3 : Granger Causality test on the alumina and aluminium prices 
lag 
length 
Levels Logs Returns 
 
ay pp →  
 
ya pp →  ay pp →  ya pp →  ay pp →  ya pp →  
1 F16,15=19.24 
(0.074%)** 
F16,15=8.39 
(1.24%)* 
F15,14=39.40 
(0.00%)** 
F15,14=14.95 
(0.2%)** 
F15,14=7.82 
(1.61%)* 
F15,14=5.82 
(3.27%)* 
2 F15,13=5.81 
(2.11%)* 
F15,13=3.79 
(5.95%) 
F14,12=5.44 
(2.82%)* 
F14,12=3.25 
(8.64%) 
F14,12=5.32 
(2.98%)* 
F14,12=2.39 
(14.68%) 
3 F14,11=3.37 
(8.37%) 
F16,15=1.82 
(23.12%) 
F13,10=2.20 
(18.81%) 
F13,10=1.42 
(32.17%) 
F13,10=2.96 
(11.94%) 
F13,10=3.31 
(9.87%) 
4 F13,9=2.53 
(19.47%) 
F13,9=1.85 
(28.28%) 
F12,8=1.79 
(32.87%) 
F12,8=1.66 
(35.13%) 
F12,8=0.95 
(53.76%) 
F12,8=1.69 
(34.69%) 
The table gives the outcome of Granger-causality tests on the aluminium and alumina 
prices.  Tail probabilities  are given in brackets. Significant outcomes at the 95% level 
are indicated in bold face. 
*denotes statistical significance at the 95 percent  level of confidence 
** denotes statistical significance at the 99 level of confidence 
 
   The next step is to determine whether the causality relation goes from input prices to 
output prices or vice-versa. I have performed a Granger-causality test using price levels, 
logs and price returns.15 The results (see table 3) are somewhat sensitive to the lag 
length used.16  If we take a lag length of one as being optimal we see evidence of 
causality in both directions at the 5% significance level, and stronger evidence of 
causality from output price to the alumina price at the 1% level. There are three 
causality effects in this direction which are significant at the 1% significance level as 
opposed to one significant effect in the opposite direction. Taking a preferred lag length 
of two, one can see that there is also stronger evidence of Granger-causality from output 
price to alumina price than from alumina price to aluminium price. There is evidence of 
causality from output prices to input prices at the 5% significance level under all three 
specifications. On the other hand there is only evidence of causality from alumina prices 
to output prices at the 10% level when levels or logs are taken. 
 
                                                 
15 I have performed Dickey Fuller tests for all of our variables. The results (presented in appendix 4.B) 
are inconclusive  due to lack of sufficient observations.  
16 The literature on Granger-causality tests highlight the importance of examining robustness to avoid 
spurious outcomes. 
In the light of these results, I characterize the alumina input and output relationship by 
the following error correction model:17 
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Regression results and diagnostics, given in  table 4.4, confirm the view that equation 
(6) provides a good representation of alumina price determination.  
 
 
 
Table 4: The Estimated Alumina Equation 
Variable log pa Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
α0 -0.860469 0.138750 -6.201581 0.0000 
α1 0.251991 0.072820 3.460486 0.0042 
α2 -0.450013 0.072736 -6.186905 0.0000 
SE of regression 0.060101 LM test (F-
statistic) 
Prob(F-
statistic) 
Heteroskedast. 
(Fstatistic) 
Prob(F-
statistic) 
0.15224 
(0.8661) 
R-squared 0.774267   0.9597 
0.4669 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.502508     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000063 
The table gives the OLS estimates of the alumina demand equation (4.6). are given in 
parentheses. 
 
 
 
4.2.The effect of aluminium prices on power prices 
 
I follow the same procedure with power prices. The pattern followed by the annual 
aluminium price and power price series suggests that they have a positive relationship. 
This is supported by a cross correlation analysis, which shows high positive 
contemporaneous and lagged correlations.18. Granger-causality results (see table 4.5) 
show weak evidence of Granger-causality from power prices to aluminium prices as we 
have just one significant effect only when for lag length of three. However there no 
                                                 
17 Note that we justify our modeling of alumina, power and aluminium price relationships by showing that 
the three set of prices are cointegrated, Our Johansen-test cointegration results are presented in table 4.B.2 
in the Appendix 4.B. 
18  See fig 4.C.4.2 and tables 4.C.4.4 and 4.C.4.5 in appendix 4.C 
evidence of causality in the reverse direction. Our results however are very sensitive to 
the choice of lag length.  
 
Table  5: Granger causality results power and aluminium price 
 
lag 
length 
Levels Logs Returns 
 
Ey pp →  yE pp →  Ey pp →  yE pp →  Ey pp →  yE pp →  
1 F16,15=1.14 
(30.48%) 
F16,15=0.88 
(36.42%) 
F15,14=3.55 
(8.37%) 
F15,14=4.41 
(5.73%) 
F15,14=0.06 
(93.5%) 
F15,14=0.02 
(86.67%) 
2 F15,13=0.95 
(41.62%) 
 F15,13=2.93 
(9.92%) 
F14,12=0.44 
(65.51%) 
F14,12=1.51 
(27.13%) 
F14,12=0.56 
(58.76%) 
F14,12=0.32 
(73.30%) 
3 F14,11=0.59 
(63.78%) 
F16,15=5.14 
(3.44%)* 
F13,10=0.19 
(89.41%) 
F13,10=2.41 
(16.50%) 
F13,10=0.44 
(72.85%) 
F13,10=1.74 
(25.70%) 
4 F13,9=1.93 
(26.84%) 
F13,9=4.64 
(8.31%) 
F12,8=0.68 
(64.95%) 
F12,8=2.73 
(21.74%) 
F12,8=0.63 
(67.19%) 
F12,8=2.84 
(20.84%) 
The table gives the outcome of Granger-causality tests on the aluminium and alumina prices. 
Tail probabilities are given in brackets. Significant outcomes at the 95% level are indicated in 
bold face. 
*denotes statistical significance at the 95 percent  level of confidence 
** denotes statistical significance at the 99 level of confidence 
 
    The relationship between the output and electricity prices is specified as  
0 1 2 , 1 3 , 1lo g lo g lo g lo gE y E t y tp p p p− −∆ = β + β ∆ + β + β  (7)  
The results from estimating (7) show that changes in current power prices are highly 
dependent on current aluminium prices and lagged discrepancies from their long run 
relationship (see table 6) 
Table 6: the power price equation 
Variable Log pE Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
β0 -0.153187 0.383686 -0.399249 0.6967 
β1 0.285026 0.042327 6.733886 0.0000 
β2 0.211959 0.047380 4.473618 0.0008 
β3 -0.472453 0.142966 -3.304657 0.0063 
SE of regression 0.03201 LM test (F-statistic)19 
Prob(F-statistic) 
0.131275 
0.08785 
R-squared 0.854083  Heterosked. (F-
statistic)Prob (F-
statistic) 
1.8992 
0.1858 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.027171     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000026 
The table gives the OLS estimates of the electricity demand equation (4.7). 
Probability values are given in parentheses. 
                                                 
19 Note that for the LM test in both equations we use  a lag length of 2 and results are robust to an 
increase of the lag length 
 
 
5. The long run price-cost relationship: the investment 
equation 
    
   I have argued that investment in new capacity governs the long run relationship 
between price and cost in aluminium smelting. Using the fact that the aluminium 
industry is highly concentrated, I have constructed a measure for Tobin’s q (see Tobin 
1987 and Shiller 1990). I estimate q as the ratio a weighted average of the share prices 
of the major aluminium producers, to the cost of capital in the industry. Share prices 
directly reflect current and anticipated prices of the aluminium metal, so the expectation 
of a high future price-cost margin translates directly into higher investment. An increase 
in the exogenous component of costs reduces q and thus eventually results in lower 
supply and higher prices. 
Investment is therefore and increasing function of q also denoted as the ‘shadow 
price of capital’. It is optimal for the firm to invest until the marginal cost equals the 
marginal return. At the margin the firm equates the value of an addition to the capital 
stock with its marginal cost, which rises with the rate of investment. It is optimal to 
incur the higher marginal cost of investing only when the shadow value of capital is 
higher than its cost. 
Investment is modelled in a rational expectations framework20 where 
0 1 1 2 4 1t t t t tI q I− −= γ + γ π + γ ∆ + γ + ε      (9) 
where : 
Ck
Sq =          (9.1) 
S = average share price 
Ck = cost of capital and 
C
p Al
t ˆ=π
21          (9.2) 
                                                 
20 I assume that investors make their decisions on the basis of current share prices which in turn are based 
on rational expectations of future corporate cashflows.  
21 This is a variable measuring profit determined by the ratio of aluminium price to fitted 
cost. We expect profits to be significant in explaining investment, and be able to derive 
a long run relationship from cost to prices. 
The cost of capital is defined as  
e
c
mK m R
m
 ∆
= + δ −    where       (9.3) 
m is the  cost of machinery  
R is the nominal interest rate (US 3 year government bond rate, IMF, International 
Financial Statistics, September 2000) 
δ is the depreciation rate which we assume to be constant at 5%,22 and  



 ∆
=
+
•
t
t
e
m
m
Em 1          (9.4) 
is an estimate for the rate of inflation in the price of machinery. 
I have used ∆q as explanatory variable instead of q as the consequence of apparent non-
stationarity of q arising out of the trend in nominal interest rates over the sample 
period.23  The change in machinery price 
em
m
∆  is modelled adaptively so that the 
expected rate of inflation for machinery is explained on the basis of the discrepancy 
between the last years predicted and current inflation value and the actual outcome – see 
Harvey (1981, pp.229-30).  
1 1ln ln (1 ) ln
e e
t t tm m m− −∆ = α∆ + − α ∆      (9.5) 
which may be written as  
1
ln (1 ) lne it t i
i
m m
∞
−
=
∆ = − α α ∆∑       (9.6) 
I take the value α=0.5 truncating the distribution at 6.The cost of capital is thus 
estimated using the calculated values from equation 9.3 a depreciation rate of 5%.  
    
  Ideally, in order to get an estimate of the average share price in the aluminium 
industry, one should average the share prices across the six dominant players: Alcoa 
(USA) Alcan (Canada),  Pechiney (France), Reynolds (USA), Kaiser (USA) and 
Alusuisse (Switzerland) . The big six produced 60% of the world total in 1975 50% in 
1984 and 42.4% in 1990. Concentration decreased over the years but it still remains 
with a few companies controlling a large proportion of global output. Because Alussuise 
lost most of its status in the industry between 1955 and 1987 I have not considered its 
                                                 
22 This figure was reported by an aluminium industry consultant who estimated that the depreciation rate 
for aluminum smelters is linear on a 20 year basis. 
23 See figures D.1 and D.2 (appendix D). 
share price as being representative for the period I analyze. Pechiney was publicly 
owned until 1995, so share prices are only available after this date. Lastly, because 
Kaiser was taken over by the Maxxam group in the late eighties,  its share prices are not 
available after that period. This leaves me with three continuous series of share prices 
corresponding to Alcoa, Alcan and Reynolds. Taken together, these three firms control 
30% of the world aluminium production (see table 1.3 p11). In order to get an estimate 
of the average aluminium share price I have taken the average share price of these three 
companies weighting the individual quotations by the inverse of their volatilities. 
Higher volatility of share prices indicates that investors expect higher risk over future 
earnings which suggests a lower degree of precision in the estimates ( see 
Parakevopoulos, 2000).  
Results from estimating equation (.9) are reported in table (6). These show that 
current changes in q and the price-cost margin are very significant in explaining 
investment. 
 
Table 6: The Estimated Investment Relationship 
Variable Investment Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
γ0 -0.069218 0.027446 -2.522002 0.0284 
γ1 0.028139 0.011812 2.382356 0.0363 
γ2 0.001687 0.000833 2.025699 0.0677 
γ3 -2.05E-06 1.12E-05 -0.183771 0.8575 
SE  of regression 0.020368 LM test24 ( F-statistic) 
Prob (F-statistic) 
 
0.1173 
0.8907 
R-squared 0.493755 Heterosked. (F-statitic) 
Prob (F-statistic) 
    Prob(F-statistic) 
0.8907 
0.7721 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.882863   0.050398 
The table gives the OLS estimates of the investment equation (4.9). 
Probability values are given in parentheses. 
 
This is an important finding as it provides with a link between average variable cost and 
investment defined as the change capacity. In the next section I close the model by 
developing a framework in which capacity is linked to the demand and supply functions 
within aluminium smelting. This is done in order to explain the nature of the long run 
relationship between cost and prices. 
                                                 
24 The lag length used for the LM residual correlation test is 2. Results are robust to the extension of the 
lag length. 
 6. Closing the model: the demand and supply 
relationships  
    In order to close the model I set up a framework in which the price setting behaviour 
represented via supply and demand equations. Price is linked to the production structure 
through investment in new smelting capacity. The inverse demand function is specified 
in equation 4.10 in which the aluminium price is defined as  a function of its own lag 
and the output gap between consumption on the one hand and capacity and lagged 
production on the other.  
 
1,413210 loglogloglog)log( −− ++++= tytttty pkykcapconsp κκκ  (10) 
         
   Estimation results, reported in table 7, show all the estimated coefficients to be highly 
significant.  The inverse demand equation may be interpreted with the investment 
equation 9 to see that high input cost leads to lower investment in new capacity, which 
in turn leads to higher prices. For a 1% decrease in capacity we expect prices to rise by 
3.17%. Higher current consumption also leads to higher prices and lower levels of past 
production also lead to upwards price pressure. 
 
Table  7: The Estimated Aluminium Price Equation 
Variable log py Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
κ0 20.55036 5.446106 3.773404 0.0031 
κ1 3.393012 0.858660 3.951522 0.0023 
κ2 -3.170838 1.120685 -2.829375 0.0164 
κ3 -1.842486 0.756808 -2.434550 0.0331 
κ4 0.435922 0.172331 2.529562 0.0280 
SE of regression 0.147562 LM (F-statistic) 
Prob (F-statistic) 
  
0.5637 
0.7721 
R-squared 0.690646 0.8366 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.538292 
Heterosked. (F-statistic) 
Prob (F-statistic) 
    Prob(F-statistic) 
0.007562 
The table gives the OLS estimates of the investment equation (4.10). 
Probability values are given in parentheses. 
. 
      The consumption variable is endogenized in equation (11) to take into account that, 
because aluminium is an intermediate product used as input by industrial producers, so 
its consumption depends on its price as well as the quantity of industry output 
production.  Current price changes affect consumption only in the following period as 
producers respond to price changes by retooling the investment process. I therefore 
model consumption with the following equation: 
)log()log()log( 1,210 −++= tALpinprodCons λλλ      (4) 
   Estimation results are reported in table 4.8. Both estimated coefficients are significant 
and have the expected sign. They imply that for every 1% increase in industrial 
production consumption to rise by 1.53%. Conversely if prices rise by 1% consumption 
next will be expected to drop by 0.13% in the next period. 
 
Table  8: Estimated Consumption Equation 
Variable  log cons Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
λ0 3.663634 0.349056 10.49583 0.0000 
λ1 1.527074 0.090536 16.86695 0.0000 
λ2 -0.131037 0.037494 -3.494842 0.0040 
SE of regression 0.030516 LM(2) F-statistic25 
Prob (F-statistic) 
2.0579 
0.0278 
R-squared 0.961930 Heteroskedast. (F-statistic)  1.3858 
0.3012 
Adjusted R-
squared 
0.956073   Prob (  F -statistic) 0.00000 
The table gives the OLS estimates of the consumption equation (11). 
Probability values are given in parentheses. 
 
Finally we set up the supply schedule in which production is restricted to be 
autoregressive, and also dependent on capacity and one period lagged prices. 
 
1,21110 loglog)1(loglog −− +−++= tyttt pycapy µµµµ    (12) 
 
Results from estimating (4.12) which are presented in table 4.9. Accordingly, we should 
expect production to rise by 0.53% when capacity increases by 1%. Moreover if prices 
rise by 1% we should expect next period production to rise by 0.10%. 
                                                 
25 Note that this result is not robust to the extension off lags as LM(5) F=2.0579 (0.1739) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 9: Estimated Production Equation 
Variable log yt Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
µ0 -0.964834 0.275043 -3.507941 0.0039 
µ1 0.532001 0.131632 4.041589 0.0014 
µ2 0.106327 0.034186 3.110228 0.0083 
SE of regression  0.030212 LM(2) F-statistic 
Prob (F-statistic) 
0.3665 
0.7013 
R-squared 0.937042     Heterosked. (F-statistic) 
Prb (F-statistic) 
9.553536 
0.3505 
Adjusted R-squared 0.927356     Prob (F-statistic)  
The table gives the OLS estimates of the production equation (4.12). Probability 
values are given in parentheses. 
 
 
    In this section have closed the model by providing a demand and supply framework 
consisting of three equations determining output price, consumption and production 
respectively. These have been linked to the firm level model through investment which 
is determined by changes in production capacity. The purpose of this section has been to 
provide a complete model of the aluminium cost and price setting structure, in which 
the long run relationship between cost and prices is determined through investment in 
new smelter capacity.  
 
7. Concluding remarks 
 
  It has been argued that, over the course of the nineteen eighties, aluminium producers 
lost their ability to control prices and as a result they could no longer fix prices as a 
mark-up over marginal cost. This prompts the question of whether the main producing 
companies are no longer highly profitable.  Long run price trends have been lower in 
real terms, but producers have since responded to the increased international 
competition by focusing on cutting costs through economies of scale, mergers 
acquisitions and technological improvement.  The purpose of this paper has been to 
shed light to this issue by determining the relationship between cost and prices within 
aluminium smelting.  
     I have specified a model to determine the relationship between cost and prices within 
aluminium smelting. Aluminium producers are seen as cost-minimizing price takers 
reflecting the fact that, since the mid nineteen eighties, aluminium has world wide been 
priced on the basis of the LME quotations. The central component of the model is a 
translog cost function to allow for conditional input demands to vary over time. The 
model also reflects the prevalent industry practice of risk sharing agreements between 
aluminium smelters and the providers of (energy and alumina) inputs shows that as a 
consequence, there is a strong short term link from the aluminium prices to production 
costs, reversing the textbook paradigm. The implications is that cost do not determine 
prices in the short run, implying that producers do not have control to increase their 
prices in the face of higher production cost. This in turn explains why profitability 
might have been lower in the last decade.  
 
   Costs affect prices only indirectly through investment in new smelting capacity. This 
is shown in our model through investment relationship relating profitability and Tobin’s 
q to the rate of investment. The model has been closed with demand and supply 
relationships illustrating the market behaviour.  
The results from this paper may be summarised as follows: 
1. The translog model gives us best fitting estimates of the average variable cost and 
the conditional input demands. It does not appear possible to restrict factor 
substitution patterns. 
2. In a framework where investment is modelled as function of Tobin's q and a 
measure of profit, costs are reflected in prices in the long run via investment in new 
smelter capacity.   
 
 The main motivation of this work has been to reflect the structural changes that have 
characterized the aluminium industry over the last few decades. I order to capture the 
changes in competition I have estimated cost and related it to output prices by  
illustrating the effect of the prevalent industry risk sharing agreements. Previous studies 
of the aluminium industry had often used unreliable measures of weighted average 
variable cost. The main contribution of this work lies on the estimation of cost applying 
the flexible translog  framework o a unique set of proprietary data. 
 
An interesting extension to this study lies on the investigation of the effects of the 
recent ongoing consolidation taking place within the aluminium industry. In the year 
2000 three important mergers have been completed (see p. 85) meaning that the industry 
moves back towards a highly concentrated structure. Two important questions arise 
which I hope to answer in future research. 
1) Is the “re-concentration” process going to change the system of cost-cutting 
incentives enforced  by the centralization of  LME trading? 
2) Given that the main players will no longer be able to control prices directly, will 
they choose play output setting games in order to indirectly set prices? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Appendix A 
 
 
 
A.1. Actual and fitted weighted average variable cost and conditional    
input demands 
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Figure A.1.1: Actual (WAVC) and Fitted (WAVCF) 
weighted average varariable cost values 
 
 
 
 
A.1 Actual and fitted conditional input demands 
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Figure A.1.2: Actual  (AAS) and fitted (AASF)  
         alumina input share values 
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Figure A.1.3 : Actual (PPS)  and Fitted 
(PPSF)  
Power input share values
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A.2 Substitution elasticities 
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A.3 Price elasticities 
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Appendix B 
 
 
 
 
 
Table B.1: Dickey Fuller test results26 
Levels Differences 
Lag 
length 
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
Py27 -2.52 -2.71* -2.71* -2.72* -3.12* -2.79* -2.91 -2.30 -1.64 -
6.25*** 
PA -3.78** -2.77* -1.78 -1.58 -2.40 -3.03* -3.56** -2.90* -1.54 -1.11 
PE -2.88* -
4.07*** 
-3.09* -2.26 -2.40 -2.34 -4.36*** -
5.51*** 
-2.66 -2.59 
c -0.396 -0.28 -0.34 -0.12  0.48 -3.41** -2.48 -3.27** -2.10 -2.25 
y -1.32 -0.15 -1.39 -1.63 -0.98 -3.65** -2.18 -1.50 -1.63 -2.01 
cap  0.82  0.82  0.42  0.54  0.48 -2.40 -1.97 -1.87 -1.82 -2.34 
I -2.40 -1.97 -1.87 -1.82 -2.34 -
4.69*** 
-2.66 -2.00 -2.00 -2.00 
 
 
Where: 
Py is the aluminium price 
PA the price of alumina 
PE is the price of power electricity 
C is consumption 
Y is production 
Cap is capacity 
I is investment measured as the change in capacity 
                                                 
26 * stands for significance at the 10% level 
** stands for significance at the 5% level 
*** stands for significance at the 1% level 
 
 
 
Table B.2 cointegration results 
 Likelihood 5 Percent 1 Percent Hypothesized 
Eigenvalue Ratio Critical Value Critical Value No. of CE(s) 
 0.951661  54.58417  29.68  35.65       None ** 
 0.558037  15.20046  15.41  20.04    At most 1 
 0.297237  4.585567   3.76   6.65    At most 2 * 
 *(**) denotes rejection of the hypothesis at 5%(1%) significance level 
 L.R. test indicates 1 cointegrating equation(s) at 5% significance level 
     
 Unnormalized Cointegrating Coefficients: 
ap  yp  Ep    
 0.002271 -0.001141  0.140005   
 0.008740  0.000577 -0.405034   
 0.010510  5.50E-05  0.033895   
     
 Normalized Cointegrating Coefficients: 1 Cointegrating Equation(s) 
ap  yp  Ep  C  
 1.000000 -0.502562  61.64752 -629.9582  
  (0.20072)  (30.9911)   
     
 Log likelihood -141.0430    
     
 Normalized Cointegrating Coefficients: 2 Cointegrating Equation(s) 
ap  yp  Ep  C  
 1.000000  0.000000 -33.79848  431.3541  
   (10.0551)   
 0.000000  1.000000 -189.9189  2111.804  
   (27.7112)   
     
 Log likelihood -135.7355    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix C 
 
 
 
 
C.1 The relationship between aluminium price and alumina price 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
C.1.1. Cross correlation analysis 
 
 
Table C.1: cross correlation analysis alumina and output price 
(returns) 
jtya RR −,,  jtya RR +,,  i   lag  lead 
      .    |*** .    |       .    |*** .    | 0 0.3311 0.3311 
      .    |*******  |       *****|    .    | 1 0.6553 -0.4659 
      .    |****.    |       .****|    .    | 2 0.3601 -0.4418 
      .  **|    .    |       .****|    .    | 3 -0.1972 -0.4097 
      *****|    .    |       .    |    .    | 4 -0.4934 0.0486 
      .   *|    .    |       .    |*** .    | 5 -0.1030 0.3499 
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Figure .C.1:Time series relationship of alumina and aluminum prices 
 
 
Table C. 2: cross correlation analysis alumina and output price 
(logs) 
itya pp −,ln,ln  itya pp +,ln,ln  i   lag  lead 
     
      .    |*** .    |       .    |*** .    | 0 0.3357 0.3357 
      .    |******** |       .****|    .    | 1 0.7493 -0.3512 
      .    |******   |     *******|    .    | 2 0.6353 -0.6466 
      .    |**  .    |      ******|    .    | 3 0.1803 -0.5546 
      .  **|    .    |       .   *|    .    | 4 -0.1725 -0.0962 
      .  **|    .    |       .    |*** .    | 5 -0.2121 0.3021 
     
     
 
 
 
 
 
C.2. The relationship between power and aluminium 
prices 
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Figure C2:Time series  plot of the (logs) of  
   aluminium and power prices  
 Table C.3: cross correlation analysis power and aluminium price 
(returns) 
jtyE RR −,,  jtyE RR +,,  i   lag  lead 
      .    |******** |       .    |******** | 0 0.7710 0.7710 
      .    |*   .    |       .    |    .    | 1 0.0761 0.0275 
      .   *|    .    |       . ***|    .    | 2 -0.0558 -0.2488 
      . ***|    .    |      ******|    .    | 3 -0.3126 -0.6079 
      .  **|    .    |       . ***|    .    | 4 -0.1593 -0.3151 
      .   *|    .    |       .    |**  .    | 5 -0.0431 0.1753 
 
 
Table C.4 : Cross correlation analysis power and aluminium price( 
logs) 
ityE pp −,ln,ln  ityE pp +,ln,ln  i   lag  lead 
     
      .    |*******  |       .    |*******  | 0 0.6540 0.6540 
      .    |**  .    |       .    |*****    | 1 0.1609 0.5073 
      .****|    .    |       .    |*** .    | 2 -0.4304 0.2730 
   ********|    .    |       .    |    .    | 3 -0.7684 -0.0362 
      *****|    .    |       .  **|    .    | 4 -0.4923 -0.2175 
      .    |    .    |       .  **|    .    | 5 0.0472 -0.2068 
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Figure D.1:Time series plot of    
                  Tobin's q 
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